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Agent-based models of the binary naming game are generalized here to represent a family of models param-
eterized by the introduction of two continuous parameters. These parameters define varying listener-speaker
interactions on the individual level with one parameter controlling the speaker and the other controlling the
listener of each interaction. The major finding presented here is that the generalized naming game preserves the
existence of critical thresholds for the size of committed minorities. Above such threshold, a committed mi-
nority causes a fast (in time logarithmic in size of the network) convergence to consensus, even when there are
other parameters influencing the system. Below such threshold, reaching consensus requires time exponential
in the size of the network. Moreover, the two introduced parameters cause bifurcations in the stabilities of the
system’s fixed points and may lead to changes in the system’s consensus.
I. INTRODUCTION
Opinion dynamics studies in Network Science [1–3] have
been concerned with the effect of social influence. Prior re-
search has shown that the interpersonal relationships in the
network have a dominant effect even in presence of outside
pressure [4, 5]; such relations manifest themselves as large-
scale changes to the opinions in the network. Various mod-
els have been proposed to incorporate this effect such as the
Voter Model [6], Threshold Model [7], Bass Model [8], and
the naming game [9–19]. The difference between the naming
game and other models is that in the naming game an individ-
ual may possess more than one opinion at a time resulting in a
mixed opinion state. This paper focuses on the naming game.
The naming game (NG) is an opinion based model in which
each node (individual) in the network possesses a list of opin-
ions which comprise its opinion state [9, 13–16, 20]. In the
version of NG model considered in this paper each interaction
starts with randomly selecting the speaker first, and then ran-
domly choosing the listener among the speaker’s neighbors.
The speaker then shares a randomly chosen opinion from its
opinion state with the listener. Various social rules are im-
posed to determine the outcome of such sharing. They can
be classified into three types ”Original”, ”Listener-only”, and
”Speaker-only” [19]. In all three cases, the listener adds the
shared opinion if it does not have it as a part of its state. If it
does, in the ”Original” version of NG, both the sender and the
listener set their state to the single opinion shared in the inter-
action. For ”Listener-only” (”Speaker-only”) only the listener
(the speaker) does so. This paper focuses on the ”Listener-
only” variant of the naming game. Although the naming game
allows for many opinions and their subsets to define the states
of the node, we restrict our attention to the simplest version
of the model in which at most two opinions coexist in the net-
work to which we will refer as binary NG model. For this
model we study how modified rules of the outcomes of opin-
ion sharing change the dynamics of the NG outcomes.
Several papers study the dynamics of the naming game in
respect to the network topology [13, 15, 21–23]. We have cho-
sen an alternative approach in which the network topology is
set to be a complete graph [14, 24, 25], so the intrinsic proper-
ties of the naming game can be analyzed. Two of such prop-
erties are the global consensus in the network and the average
time to reach it [22]. For the simplified version of the naming
game on a network with N >> 1 nodes, when the threshold
fraction of committed agents has not been reached, it has been
shown by simulations in [24] and by quasi-stationary approx-
imation in [26] that the time to consensus is Tc ∼ eN .
Committed agents in the naming game are nodes in the net-
work holding one opinion which they never alter. In the pres-
ence of committed agents [22, 27], it is possible to achieve
consensus on one opinion quickly when the fraction of com-
mitted agents is greater than a certain threshold. On a com-
plete graph, this threshold is pc ≈ 0.0979 [26, 28]. The con-
sensus time in such case drops to Tc ∼ lnN, as shown by an
eikonal approximation in [29]. In this paper, the threshold
fraction of committed agents needed for fast consensus will be
studied under modified rules on the interactions in the naming
game.
Such modified rules have been studied previously by
Baronchelli et al. [18] and Strogatz’ group [30], among oth-
ers. In the former work, Baronchelli et al. considers the ”Orig-
inal” naming game with a parameter β controlling the likeli-
hood of the two interacting agents to update their states to the
single opinion shared in their interaction. It was shown that a
threshold of β = 1/3 exists such that consensus does not oc-
cur below this threshold. In Marvel et al. [30], the authors
attempt to promote a majority of mixed state holders in the
network. In the next sections, the proposed family of naming
game models is defined and analyzed in terms of the stability
of its equilibria.
II. MEAN FIELD AND STABILITY ANALYSIS FOR
MODIFIED NAMING GAME
In this paper, we consider the binary ”Listener-only” nam-
ing game in which two unique opinions, A and B, are spread-
ing in the network. The evolution of the number of A and B
opinion holders can be cast as a random walk in 2D space.
Instead of working at the micro-state level, we consider the
2macrostate of the system. Each node in the network holds ei-
ther one of the unique opinion, or their conjunction, denoted
AB, to which for simplicity we will refer to as the mixed opin-
ion. The opinion state of the network at the macro level is a
vector~n= (nA,nB,nAB), where nA,nB, and nAB are the number
of nodes holding each of the three opinions. When consider-
ing the change in opinion state, ∆~n = (∆nA,∆nB), we are only
concerned with changes to nA and nB since nAB can be found
from the constraint N = nA + nB + nAB.
In the random walk, each interaction is assigned a probabil-
ity based on the change of the opinion macro state at each time
step. A mean field equation can be formed from these proba-
bilities by calculating the expectation of change of macro state
which represents the average motion of the system while ig-
noring any noise arising from randomness. Stability analysis
of the system’s equilibria may then be performed.
After developing a drift equation, we shall assume the num-
ber of nodes, N, in the network is large to removed fluctua-
tions due to noise. The densities of individuals with each opin-
ion state are considered, where ρA = nAN , ρB =
nB
N , ρAB =
nAB
N
and 1 = ρA +ρB +ρAB.
The models presented in the following subsections are cre-
ated by expansions of the original naming game with differ-
ent agent interactions based upon social characteristics of the
agents. These variants of the naming game define a two-
parameter family with the original naming game being a spe-
cial case in this family. We also stretch the notion of consen-
sus to allow a consensus of AB opinion. What is meant by
such consensus is that the equilibrium point is stable and the
majority of the nodes hold the mixed opinion AB.
Following the presentation of the models, linear stability
analysis is used to uncover global effects of the variants of
the naming game. Prior work in the area of stability in the
standard naming game has shown that there exist three equi-
librium points: {0,1}, {1,0}, and { 13 , 13}, where the first two
are stable and last is unstable [18, 19]. The equilibrium point
{ 13 , 13} should not be confused with Baronchelli’s threshold of
parameter value β = 13 . These equilibrium points lie in a cen-
ter manifold where initial values of densities in A and B are
vacuumed into a line and the system states moves along it to
either of the stable points. The consensus the system reaches
depends upon where the initial values of densities are located,
i.e., whether the initial state lies above or below the line bi-
secting the first quadrant.
A. Propensity Parameter in the naming game
An interaction in which the speaker holds opinion AB in the
naming game will produce a message with either the opinion
A or B with equal likelihood. Our first generalization modi-
fies this interaction; a parameter is added which governs the
probability of the opinion A being sent by the speaker. The
motivation for introducing this parameter is to enable model-
ing a network in which some members, lacking a preference to
either opinion in the mixed state, will send what they believe
is the more accepted opinion if asked to be a speaker. Other
ideas may be represented with this parameter, such as influ-
ence from media or other means of persuasion of members of
the network.
The propensity parameter, p, is the probability that a
speaker holding the opinion AB will send opinion A. Conse-
quently, (1− p) defines the probability of the speaker sending
opinion B. After each interaction, the listener updates his
opinion based on the speaker’s message. Each interaction
is associated with a particular probability of listener state
transition (see Table I). Note that ρAB = (1−ρA−ρB).
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FIG. 1: Trajectories of Propensity Models
Using Table I, we construct a mean-field equation. The sys-
tem of differential equations defines how the addition of the
propensity parameter affects trajectories of the system. The
system is described by the following drift equation:
d
dt
[
ρA
ρB
]
=
[
pρAB(ρA +ρAB)−ρAρB
ρAB(ρB +(1− p)ρAB)−ρB(ρA + pρAB)
]
. (1)
Solving for the equilibria of the system, we obtain three equi-
librium points: {0,1}, {1,0}, and { (p−1)21−p+p2 ,
p2
1−p+p2}. This
model shares the equilibrium points with the naming game
when p = 12 yielding {0,1},{1,0}, and { 13 , 13} as the fixed
points.
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FIG. 2: Average density of the opinion B at consensus time,
Tc as a function of propensity p initialized with a uniform
distribution of single opinions with the size of the network N
3TABLE I: Update events for naming game with parameter p and the associated random walk transition probabilities.
Speaker Listener Event ∆~n Probability
B, AB A A→AB (−1,0) P(A−) = ρA(ρB +(1− p)ρAB)
A, AB AB AB→A (1,0) P(A+)= ρAB(ρA + pρAB)
A, AB B B→AB (0,−1) P(B−) = ρB(ρA + pρAB)
B,AB AB AB→B (0,1) P(B+)= ρAB(ρB +(1− p)ρAB)
A,B,AB A,B,AB No change (0,0) P(0) = ρA(ρA + pρAB)+ρB(ρB +(1− p)ρAB)
Upon linearization about the fixed points, we obtain the ma-
trix: [
ρ∗B(p−1)− p ρ∗A(p−1)+2p(ρ∗B−1)
−2(ρ∗A(p−1)+1)− p(ρ∗B−2) p(1−ρ∗A)−1
]
.
The equilibrium points {0,1},{1,0} are stable for all values of
p, while the third equilibrium point remains a saddle point ex-
cept when it degenerates at parameter values p = 1 and p = 0.
This is because as p tends to 1, or 0, the third equilibrium
point merges with {1,0}, or {0,1}, respectively. Analytically,
the third point follows the parametric curve { (p−1)21−p+p2 ,
p2
1−p+p2}
which connects the two stable equilibrium points. When
p > 1/2 the saddle point is closer to {1,0}which causes more
A opinion holders to be present, ultimately leading to an A
consensus. Likewise when p < 1/2, the saddle point is closer
to {0,1}, drifting the system towards B consensus. This be-
havior can be seen in Fig. 1 where consensus on B is more
likely when parameter values are 0 ≤ p < 12 while consensus
on A is more likely for parameter values 12 < p≤ 1.
Since the propensity parameter p is a measure of which
opinion a member holding mixed opinion believes to be more
accepted, the drift seen from the stability analysis fits nat-
urally. As the mixed opinion holders follow an inclination
that one opinion surpasses the other, with time more and more
members will hold the opinion perceived as better.
An interpretation for p parameter is a polarization of the
stable points {1,0},{0,1}. As the saddle point moves closer
to one of the stable points, it pushes more and more members
towards the opposite stable point. When members in mixed
state have a higher propensity to say opinion A when they are
speakers, the average opinion such a member shares with lis-
tener shifts towards that opinion.
Fig. 2 shows the average over twenty runs of the density of
opinion B in the network at consensus state when the network
is initialized with a uniform distribution of opinions. Near the
parameter value p = 0.5 a fast transition occurs from consen-
sus on opinion B to consensus on opinion A. As the size of
the network N increases, the densities of opinion B undergo
increasingly fast transition and the plots of these densities as a
function of propensity parameter p converge to the Heaviside
step function. This implies that propensity controls to which
opinion consensus converges by creating with the drift shown
in the stability analysis of the mean field approximation of the
model dynamics and visible in trajectories of mean field (Fig.
1).
It should be noted that by definition, when p = 12 the
propensity model becomes the naming game.
B. Stickiness Parameter in the naming game
It is possible to have individuals in the network who will
resist accepting any unique opinion when in a mixed state as
they prefer not to side with either one. Following this idea,
the corresponding model redefines the interaction with a lis-
tener that holds the mixed opinion. In the naming game, when
such interaction occurs, the listener changes its state to the
speaker’s opinion. In the extended model, the listener may re-
sist changing to a single opinion and instead may remain in
its mixed state. This extension to the naming game is accom-
plished with a simple addition of a parameter defining proba-
bilities of two possible outcomes of any interaction involving
a listener in the mixed state. This parameter, denoted s, can
be interpreted as the measure of stickiness to mixed opinion
by a listener holding it. Thus, s defines the probability that the
listener will keep its mixed opinion regardless of the interac-
tion with the speaker. Consequently, the value (1− s) defines
the probability that a listener will change its opinion to the
unique opinion received. The parameter s maps onto param-
eter β defined earlier in [18, 19] by a simple transformation
s = (1−β ).
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FIG. 3: Trajectories of Stickiness Model
Like in the previous section, we use the probabilities of the
listener state transitions (Table II) to construct a mean-field
4TABLE II: Update events for the naming game with parameter s and associated random walk transition probabilities.
Speaker Listener Event ∆~n Probability
B or AB A A→AB (−1,0) P(A−) = ρA(ρB + 12 ρAB)
A or AB AB AB→A (1,0) P(A+)= (1− s)ρAB(ρA + 12 ρAB)
A or AB B B→AB (0,−1) P(B−) = ρB(ρA + 12 ρAB)
B or AB AB AB→B (0,1) P(B+)= (1− s)ρAB(ρB + 12 ρAB)
A,B, or AB = Speaker No change (0,0) P(0) = (ρA + 12 ρAB)(ρA + sρAB)+(ρB + 12 ρAB)(ρB + sρAB)
equation:
d
dt
[
ρA
ρB
]
=
[
1
2 (1− s)ρAB(1+ρA−ρB)− 12 ρA(1+ρB−ρA)
1
2 (1− s)ρAB(1+ρB−ρA)− 12 ρB(1+ρA−ρB)
]
. (2)
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FIG. 4: Average ratio of time to consensus, Tc, to size of the
network N as a function of stickiness to mixed opinion s
initialized with a uniform distribution of single opinions.
Its equilibria are {0,1},{1,0}, and { s−12s−3 , s−12s−3}. By defini-
tion, when s = 0, the model becomes the naming game whose
well-known equilibria are {0,1},{1,0}, and { 13 , 13}. After lin-
earizing the system, we obtain:[
− 12 + sρ∗A− 12 ρ∗B − 12 ρ∗A +(s−1)(1−ρ∗B)
(s−1)(1−ρ∗A)− 12 ρ∗B − 12 − 12 ρ∗A + sρ∗B
]
.
Unlike in the propensity model, where the saddle point trav-
eled from consensus on A to consensus on B for values of p
varying from 0 to 1, the stability of the points will change from
two stable points and a saddle point into one stable point and
two saddle points. The new stable node will also travels to-
wards the origin. These two sets of stabilities can be observed
in two intervals of parameter s that are: [0, 12 ) and (
1
2 ,1] as
portrayed in Fig. 3.
Inspecting the interval [0, 12) of parameter s values, we
notice that the points {0,1} and {1,0} are stable while
{ s−12s−3 , s−12s−3} is a saddle. The trajectories for these values of
parameter s are similar to that of the NG model except that as
s moves towards 12 , the center manifold of the system bends
closer towards the origins.
In the interval ( 12 ,1] of parameter s values, the saddle point
{ s−12s−3 , s−12s−3} becomes a stable point and the two stable points{1,0} and {0,1} become saddle points. Thus, when the stick-
iness increase to s = 1, all the mixed opinion nodes stop lis-
tening to outside information and remain mixed. The whole
system eventually converges to the mixed opinion.
In this interval (i.e. for 12 < s ≤ 1), no longer the consen-
sus on A or B happens because, thanks to stickiness, there
are always some nodes in mixed opinion state present. In the
“Original” NG model, as established in [18], consensus is not
possible for 0 < β < 13 where β = 1− s, so for 23 < s < 1.
This is consistent with the difference in models used. The in-
teractions between pairs of nodes in mixed state remove nodes
in mixed opinion state twice as fast as in “Listener-only” NG
model used here, Hence, keeping nodes in mixed opinion state
surviving, the “Original” NG model requires higher values of
s > 23 than s >
1
2 needed for NG model used here. The consis-
tent presence of nodes in the mixed state in this interval moti-
vated us to generalizing the notion of a consensus. Instead of a
consensus in which all nodes hold the same opinion, a steady
state arises in which the majority of the nodes hold the mixed
opinion while, on average, a fixed number of unique opinions
A and B holders remain.
To complete the analysis, when parameter s = 12 the equi-
librium point { s−12s−3 , s−12s−3} becomes degenerate. However,
through observation of the approximate trajectories (Fig. 3),
we conclude there is no attraction to or repulsion from the
points {0,1} and {1,0}. Instead all trajectories move towards
a hyperbolic curve. The parameter value s = 12 is a pitch-
fork bifurcation point which can be shown with an appropriate
change of variables.
Figure 4 shows the normalized time to consensus Tc/N
taken over twenty runs. Values of Tc/N = 500 are in fact lower
bounds of the normalized consensus time since this value was
used to stop the simulations if the consensus was not reached
by then. As the parameter s increases, a fast transition occurs
after which the network no longer can reach consensus. As
the size of the network N increases, the location of this fast
transition recedes towards s = 0.5 as suggested by the inver-
sion of stabilities in the mean field valid when there exists a
large population of mixed opinion holders. These results also
suggest that the effect of stickiness is stronger for large net-
works where smaller values of the parameter s will result in
a loss of consensus while smaller networks require stronger
stickiness for the inversion seen in the mean field to occur.
By definition, at s = 0, the system reverts to the NG model
where {0,1} and {1,0} are stable points and { 13 , 13} is a saddle
point.
5TABLE III: Update events for naming game with parameters p and s, and associated random walk transition probabilities.
Speaker Listener Event ∆~n Probability
B or AB A A→AB (−1,0) P(A−) = ρA(ρB +(1− p)ρAB)
A or AB AB AB→A (1,0) P(A+)= (1− s)ρAB(ρA + pρAB)
A or AB B B→AB (0,−1) P(B−) = ρB(ρA + pρ −AB)
B or AB AB AB→B (0,1) P(B+)= (1− s)ρAB(ρB +(1− p)ρAB)
A,B, or AB = Speaker No change (0,0) P(0) = (ρA + pρAB)(ρA + sρAB)+(ρB +(1− p)ρAB)(ρB + sρAB)
TABLE IV: Update events for naming game with parameter s and associated random walk transition probabilities.
Speaker Listener Event ∆~n Probability
B or AB A A→AB (−1,0) P(A−) = ρA(ρB + 12 ρAB)
A or AB AB AB→A (1,0) P(A+)= (1− s)ρAB(ρA + cA + 12 ρAB)
A or AB B B→AB (0,−1) P(B−) = ρB(ρA + cA + 12 ρAB)
B or AB AB AB→B (0,1) P(B+)= (1− s)ρAB(ρB + 12 ρAB)
A,B, or AB = Speaker No change (0,0) P(0) = (ρA + cA + 12 ρAB)(ρA + cA + sρAB)+(ρB + 12 ρAB)(ρB + sρAB)
C. Propensity and Stickiness Parameters in the naming game
The socially motivated interactions presented in the two
previous sections may co-exist within the same network.
Hence, here we present a model that incorporates both propen-
sity and stickiness. Each parameter is identical to its counter-
part introduced in one of the two previous sections. The peo-
ple holding mixed opinion may be influenced by some outside
source, as reflected by parameter p, while still maintaining the
stickiness, s, to mixed opinion. It should be noted that for
some values of parameters s and p, the positions of equilibria
are outside of the feasible range of densities of nodes in differ-
ent states. These values are discussed briefly in this section.
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FIG. 5: Trajectories of Two-Parameter naming game
The mean-field for this variation of the NG model (using
Table III) is:
d
dt
[
ρA
ρB
]
=
[
(1− s)ρAB(ρA + pρAB)−ρA(ρB +(1− p)ρAB)
(1− s)ρAB(ρB +(1− p)ρAB)−ρB(ρA + pρAB)
]
. (3)
Solving for the equilibria of the propensity and
stickiness model yields the points {0,1},{1,0}, and
{ (s−1)(p+s−1)2
(2s−1)(p2−p+(s−1)2) ,
(s−1)(p−s)2
(2s−1)(p2−p+(s−1)2)}. By definition,
when s = 0, p = 1/2 the system becomes the NG model with
equilibria points {0,1}, {1,0}, and { 13 , 13}.
In this model, there are two stationary equilibria which do
not vary with different values of parameters s and p. How-
ever, the third point presents a few drawbacks to the model.
Half of the values of parameters p and s yield unfeasible den-
sities of nodes in different states; those are densities that do
not satisfy constraints such as 1 = ρA + ρB + ρAB. Since the
focus of this paper is on linear stability, we consider only such
combinations of values of parameters s and p that satisfy the
node density range and stability criteria. With this clarifica-
tion, there are two regions in the p− s plane satisfying the
criteria: region (1) (1− s) > p intersected with p > s, and
region (2): p > (1− s) intersected with p < s.
For the values within the hourglass-like region representing
the union of both regions, the stability of the third equilibrium
point combines behavior of both the propensity and stickiness
models (Fig. 5). The dominating variable in the combined
model is the parameters s of the stickiness model. While
propensity affects how the equilibrium point swings from one
consensus point to another, the stickiness directly affects the
stability of the equilibria.
There are two regions of equilibrium points, one with s in
the interval [0,1/2) and another with s in the complementary
interval (1/2,1]. In the first interval, the first two equilibria are
stable while the third is a saddle point. However in the second
interval, we conclude, as we did in section II.B, that for val-
ues of s in (1/2,1] the third equilibrium point becomes stable
while the first two become saddle points while the consensus
points (0,1) and (0,1) remain saddle points. This change of
equilibria occurs when s = 1/2.
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Figure 6 and 7 show the average ratio of consensus time, Tc,
to size of the network, N over twenty runs with the network
size of N = 1000. In figure 6, for values of stickiness s > 12
a sharp transition occurs where consensus at opinions A and
B is changed with a majority of AB holders as seen in the
previously discussed region (2). In figure 7, a weight was
added to distinguish which consensus, A or B, occurs. For
values of propensity p < 12 , consensus occurs most often with
opinion B. Likewise, consensus occurs at the opinion A for
values of propensity p > 12 .
III. COMMITTED AGENTS IN THE STICKINESS MODEL
Committed agents [30, 31] are holders of a unique opinion
that they preserve regardless of interactions in which they are
listeners. Yet, as speakers, they send their opinion and can
influence holders of other opinions. Understanding how com-
mitted minorities in the naming game affect the consensus is
a fundamental issue of NG dynamics. The notion of com-
mitted agents has also received attention in the Voter Model
[32]. The important aspects of the study of committed agents
include the time to consensus and the minimum density of
committed agents necessary for fast consensus [33]. Natu-
rally, an addition of committed agents imposes a strong drift
to the opinion that these agents hold. The general rules for
constructing the drift equation do not differ from those of the
normal model except when the chosen listener is a member of
the committed minority.
A. Stickiness Model with Committed Agents
The motivation behind adding some fraction of committed
agents to the stickiness model is to see whether it is possible to
cause a consensus on mixed opinion even in presence of a drift
from the introduced committed agents when the stickiness
strength grows beyond the bifurcation point discussed ear-
lier. Committed agents will be represented by their density cA
ranging from 0 to 1. This addition requires a modification to
the density equation, as now we have 1 = ρA +cA +ρB +ρAB.
Using the variables defined in Table IV, the mean-field is:
d
dt
[
ρA
ρB
]
=
[
(1− s)ρAB(ρA + cA + 12 ρAB)−ρA(ρB + 12 ρAB)
(1− s)ρAB(ρB + 12 ρAB)−ρB(ρA + cA + 12 ρAB)
]
. (4)
B. Stability of Stickiness Model with Committed Agents
Solving the equation d~ρdt = 0 yields the equilibrium points{1− cA,0} and the conjugate pair
{
(s−1)(2s−1+cA (7−6s)∓
√
2s−1
√
2s−1+c2A(2s−1)+2cA(7−6s)
6−16s+8s2 ,
(4−11s+6s2+cA(−4+5s−2s2)∓(2−s)
√
(2s−1)(2s−1+c2A (2s−1)−2cA(6s−7))
6−16s+8s2 .
}
Before linearizing the stickiness model and applying stability
analysis, the conjugate pair should be inspected. The number
of equilibrium points can be reduced to two by setting the
discriminant to zero. This imposes an equation
cA =
6s− 7± 4
√
3− 5s+ 2s2
2s− 1
giving two values for cA. This curve in cA − s space plane
becomes infeasible when one or both cA values becomes neg-
ative as well as when cA ≥ 1. For the parameter s ≥ 12 both
values of cA are negative which will be discussed later in this
section. When the parameter s is 0 ≤ s < 12 , the larger value
of cA is greater than 1 and is infeasible under our constraints.
7This leaves the smaller value of cA to which we will refer as
ccA which satisfies our constraints, defined as
ccA =
6s− 7+ 4
√
3− 5s+ 2s2
2s− 1 .
The pairs {cA,s} represent some threshold of a bifurcation and
ccA defined above represents some critical fraction of commit-
ted agents.
Linearizing the stickiness with committed agent model
about an arbitrary equilibrium point (ρ∗A,ρ∗B) yields the fol-
lowing matrix:[
1
2 (2sρ∗A−ρ∗B + cA(2s−1)−1 −
ρ∗A
2 +(1− s)ρ∗B + s−1
(1− s)ρ∗A−
ρ∗B
2 +(1− s)cA + s−1 12 (−ρ∗A +2sρ∗B− (cA +1))
]
.
Using this equation for the threshold, we confirm that indeed
the equation gives a critical fraction of committed agents nec-
essary for forcing a steady-state. For an arbitrary s < 12 , a
saddle-point bifurcation occurs at ccA. When cA is smaller than
ccA a stable point and a saddle point appear along with the al-
ready existing stable point at {1− cA,0} (Fig. 8(a)).
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
ρA
ρ B
(a) s=0.1, cA=0.03
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
ρA
ρ B
(b) s=0.25, cA=0.3
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
ρA
ρ B
(c) s=0.7, cA=0.03
FIG. 8: Trajectories of Stickiness Model with Committed
Agents computed using Runge Kutta
When cA is greater than ccA, degeneracies occur in both the
location and the stability of the equilibrium point. Though
infeasible, a conjugate pair of complex equilibrium points ap-
pears whose eigenvalues are also complex numbers. However,
the two equilibrium points are unstable spirals whose respec-
tive complex components seem to cancel out yielding a saddle
node. The numerically plotted trajectories (Fig. 8(b)) support
the hypothesis of canceling complex terms and enables us to
observe that the system is in an active steady-state while mak-
ing a flow towards the consensus point {1− cA,0}. These
results can be seen in Fig. 8(b), however this odd stability is
not yet fully analyzed, so we plan to study it further in future
work.
As mentioned earlier, the necessary values of cA dependent
on the parameter s did not satisfy our constraints when the
parameter s > 12 . The stickiness model without committed
agents undergoes a bifurcation at the parameter s = 12 when
the saddle point becomes stable and remains so when s in-
creases towards 1. The same behavior is observed in the
stickiness model with committed agents. Since the A opin-
ion consensus in the stickiness model changes it stability from
a stable point to a saddle point, the corresponding curve in
cA−s plane can be found by checking the stability of the point
{1− cA,0}. When the following eigenvalue
1
2
(−cA + 2s− 1),
which has an eigenvector along the center manifold, changes
from negative to positive, a saddle point arises. Setting this
eigenvalue to zero and solving for cA yield the line cA = 2s−1.
This equation also yields another critical fraction of agents
who are able to overcome the pull of stickiness and cause an
active steady-state to occur once again.
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FIG. 9: Global Stability in cA− s plane
This line is a boundary of stabilities as seen in the case
when cA = 0. When cA lies above the boundary, the system re-
sembles the standard naming game model with the exception
of the case when the number of committed agents is above the
critical point. When cA is below the boundary, we get a con-
sensus on the mixed opinion. This means that even when there
is enough committed agents to cause consensus on opinion A,
from our first critical fraction of agents, the stickiness domi-
nates the system and allows for only a few remaining mem-
bers to hold unique opinions. However when cA > 2s− 1, the
active steady-state returns as seen in Fig. 9.
Figure 10 shows the consensus time normalized by the net-
works size, Tc/N, taken over twenty runs. Like in Figure 4,
values of Tc/N = 500 represent a lower bound of the normal-
ized consensus time, as this value was used to stop the simu-
lations if the consensus was not reached by then. As shown
in Figure 7, for values 12 < s ≤ 1, a triangular AB dominant
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FIG. 10: Average ratio of time to consensus, Tc, to the
network size, N, as a function of stickiness, s, and the
fraction, cA, of nodes committed to opinion A. Lighter color
implies longer consensus times.
region exists where neither consensus to opinions A nor to B
occur. For lower values of s, the transition between A and B
dominance to an active steady-state occurs for lower fractions
of committed agents then predicted. Despite this minor dif-
ference, when the fraction of agents committed to opinion A
is greater than the threshold value, an active steady-state with
majority of A opinion holders occurs. Conversely, for small
values of the fraction of committed agents, opinions A and B
coexist without either achieving lasting majority.
IV. SUMMARY
The proposed models are developed using a mean field on
a complete graph. Since the mean actions are considered, the
model accurately describes the network when a large popula-
tion exists. When smaller groups are considered, these find-
ings do not to take into account the random fluctuations and
the stochastic stabilities causing discrepancies in the models’
accuracy. In a social network, it is not necessarily true that in-
dividuals are familiar with and talk to every other member of
network. In such a case, an incomplete graph should be used
instead of a complete graph. The linearization used to check
stability of these models is accurate when non-degenerate sta-
bilities are considered. However, when degenerate stabilities
are found, it is not sufficient to consider only linear terms and
higher order terms need to be analyzed.
By introducing the parameters for propensity and stickiness
into the naming game, we have uncovered both a drift in equi-
librium points as well as the occurrence of a new stability
point (Table V). The propensity of speakers in the system is
intended to capture some external influence such as media or
opinions supported by a government leader which introduces
some bias (or barrier) in willingness of members of the net-
work to share an opposing opinion with others. Such barrier
TABLE V: Effects of variations to the naming game
Parameter Range of Parame-
ters
Effects on Linear Stability
Propensity, p 0 ≤ p < 12 Stronger drift towards consensus on A
than on B.
1
2 < p≤ 0 Stronger drift towards consensus on B
than on A.
Stickiness, s 0≤ s < 12 Same stability as naming game with
drift towards both A and B.
1
2 < s≤ 1 Inversions of stability of naming game,
with drift towards ’consensus’ at mixed
opinion.
or bias requires a larger than usual majority of opinion holders
against the external influence to create a drift towards the op-
posing opinion consensus. If this larger threshold is not met,
the network will reach a consensus on opinion supported by
external influence. The stickiness model will lead to an in-
version in the stability of equilibrium points. This inversion
allows for a consensus like state in the mixed opinion; the
system has a majority of members holding this opinion. If
holders of mixed opinion are reluctant to accept any unique
opinion, stubbornly sticking to their current one, it makes it
less likely that any unique opinion will dominate the network.
Such stubborn individuals act like social mediators, prevent-
ing dominance by any unique opinion. As the stickiness to
mixed opinion by its holders becomes stronger and stronger,
the change of opinions and consequently a global consensus
become less and less likely. The two-parameter model inte-
grates effects of the introduced two parameters; such integra-
tion increases system complexity, some aspects of which war-
rant further study.
The addition of committed agents to the stickiness model
has been shown to hold similar properties to that of the nam-
ing game solely with committed agents. The stickiness model
with committed agents has two bifurcations which create bar-
rier to reaching an active steady-state at which the committed
opinion becomes a global consensus. This model has proper-
ties similar to the stickiness model. When stickiness is weak,
a barrier appears near the opinion without a committed major-
ity, inhibiting any drift towards consensus on the opinion held
by the committed agents. Instead, a consensus-like state ap-
pears in the opposing opinion, as seen in the standard model
for the naming game. As the fraction of committed agents
reaches critical point, their influence overcomes the opinions
of the populace and drives the system to consensus.
When stickiness is strong, a barrier appears closer to the
committed opinion critical fraction but it is buffered by the
holders of mixed opinion, as seen in the model with only
stickiness present. Hence, the stickiness increases the criti-
cal fraction of committed agents necessary to overcome the
mixed opinion holders’ barrier. With the fraction of commit-
ted agents below the critical threshold, the state of the sys-
tem becomes a consensus-like state with the majority of the
network members holding mixed opinion. As the fraction of
committed agents increases to critical point, the pull of the
committed minority overcomes the power of stickiness, creat-
9ing a strong drift towards consensus on the committed opin-
ion. Overall, the stickiness of holders strongly controls the
dynamics of the committed agent model.
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